

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 IO-14 ISO-00 SCI-06 AEC-11 CIAE-00 H-03

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INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

USMISSION BERLIN

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

CINCPAC

DIA

USMISSION GENEVA

USMISSION NATO

SDEL SALT TWO GENEVA 11

USDEL USSCC GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 MOSCOW 13588

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652 GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PARM, MARR, UR, US

SUBJ: USA JOURNAL ON SALT ISSUES

1. SUMMARY. THE SOVIET USA INSTITUTE JOURNAL CARRIES
IN ITS SEPTEMBER ISSUE AN ARTICLE BY G.A. GROFIMENKO ON
US-SOVIET RELATIONS WHICH DISCUSSES IN SOME DETAIL
STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION. IN THE ARTICLE TROFIMENKO
LISTS SIX NEGOTIATING PRINCIPLES WHICH LED TO SUCCESS
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IN SALT I: "EQUAL SECURITY"; "SIMULTANEITY OF QUANTITATIVE

AND QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS"; IDENTITY OF TIME FRAMES IN WHICH STRATEGIC SYSTEMS ARE COMPARED; VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL MEANS; ALLOWANCE FOR NATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN APPROACH TO STRATEGIC PROBLEMS; AND REQUIREMENT THAT AGREEMENT ULTIMATELY REST ON POLITICAL DECISIONS. TROFIMENKO COMMENTS ON THE LONGER TERM CONTEMPLATED FOR THE NEW OFFENSIVE WEAPONS AGREEMENT. HE BRANDS SECRETARY SCHLESINGER'S APPROACH ON RETARGETING AS AN ATTEMPT TO "SIGNAL BY THREAT" AND TO GAIN UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE. END SUMMARY.

2. TROFIMENKO, WHOSE ARTICLE IS ENTITLED "QUESTIONS ON THE CONSOLIDATION OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS," IS A SENIOR RESEARCHER OF THE USA INSTITUTE, A MEMBER OF THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF THE JOURNAL, AND A FREQUENT WRITER ON US POL "MIL AFFAIRS, ESPECIALLY SALT. TROFIMENKO COVERS A RATHER BROAD SPECTRUM OF QUESTIONS DEALING WITH US-SOVIET AFFAIRS IN THE ARTICLE. THIS CABLE REPORTS ONLY ON THOSE PARTS OF THE ARTICLE HAVING TO DO WITH STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION; OTHER POINTS OF INTEREST WILL BE COVERED BY SEPTEL.

3. IN HIS DISCUSSION OF STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL, TROFIMENKO ENUMERATES SIX PRINCIPLES AS HAVING BEEN GOVERNING IN SALT I -- PRINCIPLES WHICH, IN HIS ESTIMATION, MADE POSSIBLE A SURPRISING AMOUNT OF PROGRESS IN THE THREE YEARS OF NEGOTIATION PRECEDING THE SALT I AGREEMENT. HIS REPETITION OF THESE PRINCIPLES IN THIS ARTICLE CONVEYS HIS IMPLICIT APPROVAL OF THEM FOR USE IN ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS AS WELL.

(A) THE MAIN PRINCIPLE OF SALT I WAS "EQUAL SECURITY". "ACCORDING TO THIS PRINCIPLE, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NUCLEAR BALANCE WAS NOT TO BE ACCOMPLISHED SIMPLY BY MEANS OF A QUANTITATIVE LEVELING OFF OF DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE STRATEGIC WEAPONS OF THE TWO SIDES, BUT RATHER BY TAKING INTO ACCOUNT EXISTING SO-CALLED 'STRATEGIC ASYMMETRIES' (CONNECTED WITH FACTORS OF A GEOGRAPHICAL, DEMOGRAPHICAL, OR TECHNICAL NATURE, AND SO ON). THIS ALLOWED THE FIXING OF ESSENTIAL

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STRATEGIC BALANCE IN THE ARSENALS OF THE TWO SIDES WHICH INCLUDED POSSIBLE NUMERICAL IMBALANCES IN SOME STRATEGIC WEAPON SYSTEMS."

(B) THE SECOND PRINCIPLE WAS "SIMULTANEITY OF QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS OF STRATEGIC SYSTEMS". WHILE THE MAIN THRUST OF SALT I WAS ON QUANTITATIVE LIMITATIONS, QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS WERE ALSO INCLUDED,

SUCH AS SPECIFICATION OF ALLOWABLE RADAR TYPES IN THE ABM AGREEMENT.

(C) THE THIRD PRINCIPLE "REQUIRES THAT IN DEALING WITH QUESTIONS OF STRATEGIC BALANCE, COMPARISONS BE MADE BETWEEN THE PRESENT STATE AND POTENTIAL OF STRATEGIC SYSTEMS OF ONE SIDE AND THE PRESENT STATE AND POTENTIAL OF STRATEGIC SYSTEMS OF THE OTHER, NOT BETWEEN THE PRESENT...PARAMETERS OF THE SYSTEMS OF ONE SIDE AND THE FUTURE PARAMETERS OF THE OTHER".

(D) THE FOURTH PRINCIPLE WAS VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL MEANS -- "PRIMARILY BY SATELLITES, BUT ALSO BY OTHER TECHNICAL OBSERVATION SYSTEMS."

(E) THE FIFTH PRINCIPLE WAS "TAKING INTO ACCOUNT DIFFERENCES IN THE MILITARY-TECHNOLOGICAL APPROACH" OF THE TWO SIDES TO STRATEGIC QUESTIONS. AS AN EXAMPLE HE NOTES THAT UNDER THE ABM AGREEMENT THE US CHOSE TO USE ITS ABM TO PROTECT MISSILE SITES, THE SOVIETS CHOSE TO PROTECT MOSCOW. IN ORDER TO RECONCILE THESE TWO APPROACHES, THE ABM AGREEMENT MADE PROVISIONS FOR DEVELOPING A SECOND ABM COMPLEX FOR THE USSR AND A SECOND FOR THE US, WITH THE OTHER SIDE'S APPROACH GOVERNING WHERE THE SECOND COMPLEX WAS TO BE LOCATED. EXPANDING ON THE QUESTION OF A "NATIONAL APPROACH" LATER ON IN THE ARTICLE, TROFIMENKO CHIDES AMERICAN THEORETICIANS AND REPRESENTATIVES IN ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS WHO, "IN PLACE OF A SEARCH FOR COMPROMISE, ...ATTEMPT TO PROPOSE TO THE OTHER SIDE A PURELY AMERICAN MODEL AS A RESOLUTION, ONE WHICH ANSWERS THE TRADITIONS OF MILITARY-TECHNOLOGICAL POLICIES OF THE USA, BUT WHICH DIFFERS FUNDAMENTALLY FROM THE TRADITION

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AND PRINCIPLES OF THE MILITARY-TECHNOLOGICAL POLICIES" OF THE SOVIET UNION. HE CONTINUES THAT "A SIMILAR APPROACH WAS THE MAIN STUMBLING BLOCK ON THE ROAD TO A RESOLUTION OF QUESTIONS CONCERNING LIMITATIONS ON QUALITATIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONRY, WHICH MADE NECESSARY A DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THIS PROBLEM AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL IN MOSCOW IN THE SUMMER OF 1974 WITH THE AIRM OF DEVELOPING APPROPRIATE NEGOTIATING INSTRUCTIONS WHICH TAKE INTO ACCOUNT DIFFERENCES IN APPROACH AND THE INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES."

(B) THE LAST PRINCIPLE -- "AND THIS BECAME NOT JUST A PRINCIPLE, BUT THE UNDERLYING (GENERAL'NYJ) IDEA OF THE AGREEMENTS - WAS THE UNDERSTANDING THAT EVEN WITH

THE COLOSSAL IMPORTANCE OF COMPARING TECHNICAL
PARAMETERS OF CORRESPONDING SYSTEMS ...IT WAS NEVERTHELESS
IMPERATIVE THAT AGREEMENT REST PRIMARILY ON FUNDAMENTAL
POLITICAL DECISIONS (PRINTSIPIAL'NYE POLITICHESKIE
RESHENIYA)". WITH THESE DECISIONS MADE, THE BASIC
QUESTION OF A STARTING POINT --WHETHER "FROM THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF MUTUAL TRUST; OR FROM MEASURES WHICH
POSTULATED A STATE OF ABSOLUTE DISTRUST, THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF WHICH, HOWEVER, WOULD GIVE BIRTH TO TRUST" -- WAS
SOLVED. THE STEPS UNDERTAKEN LEADING TO SALT I TOOK
BOTH APPROACHES; THE POLITICAL DECISIONS ALLOWED
SENSITIVE INFORMATION TO BE EXCHANGED, AND THE

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 IO-14 ISO-00 AEC-11 CIAE-00 H-03 INR-11

L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-04 OMB-01 PA-04 PM-07 PRS-01 SAJ-01

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INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRAD

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AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

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SOLUTION OF PROBLEMS THROUGH HONEST COMPROMISE,
--ANOTHER POLITICAL DECISION -- STRENGTHENED THIS
TRUST AND STIMULATED FURTHER EFFORTS. LATER IN THE
ARTICLE TROFIMENKO (COMMENTING ON THE TTB AGREEMENT
TO EXCHANGE CALIBRATION INFORMATION) CONTENTS THAT
"AGREEMENT ON THE EXCHANGE OF SUCH INFORMATION,
WHICH UNTIL RECENTLY WOULD HAVE BEEN REGARDED AS
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COMPLETELY CONFIDENTIAL, TESTIFIES TO THE HIGH DEGREE
OF MUTUAL TRUST WHICH HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE
TWO SIDES AND TO THEIR COMPLETELY SERIOUS APPROACH
TO RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEMS OF DISARMAMENT."

3. TROFIMENKO NOTES THAT ONE OF THE REASONS AGREEMENT WAS
NOT REACHED BY THE 1974 SUMMIT WAS THE FAILURE TO DEVELOP
CRITERIA ON EQUIVALENCE IN SUCH A "VERY IMPORTANT QUANTITATIVE--
QUALITATIVE PARAMETER AS THE NUMBER OF INDIVIDUAL STRATEGIC
WARHEADS OF VARIOUS TYPES WHICH ARE EQUIPPED WITH A MEANS
OF DELIVERY."

4. RETARGETING: TROFIMENKO COMMENTS THAT AMERICAN SPECIALISTS
IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ARE MUCH OCCUPIED WITH THE QUESTION
OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN NATIONS, AND ARE OF THE OPINION THAT
DURING THE COLD WAR MOST SUCH COMMUNICATION WAS DONE BY
THREAT. HE CONTINUES THAT "SOME REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX STILL ATTEMPT TO RESORT TO
'SIGNALING BY THREAT'," AND GIVES AS AN EXAMPLE THE
"SCHLESINGER DOCTRINE" OF "RETARGETING". HE REASONS THAT
SINCE VALUABLE INFORMATION ON SUCH A SENSITIVE SUBJECT
AS ACTUAL TARGETS OF THESE MISSILES WOULD NOT BE
REVEALED TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC, STATEMENTS ON THIS
SUBJECT ARE A "DELIBERATE ATTEMPT TO EXERT PSYCHOLOGICAL
PRESSURE" ON THE SOVIET SIDE, "AN ATTEMPT TO GAIN, IF
NOT PURELY MILITARY TECHNOLOGICAL, THEN AT LEAST
CONCEPTUAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL ADVANTAGES."

5. DESTABILIZATION: TROFIMENKO CONTENTS THAT SUCH
STATEMENTS AS THOSE ON RETARGETING ARE NOT EXCUSED BY
ANY ATTEMPT TO PORTRAY THEM AS AN EFFORT TO GAIN BARGAINING
CHIPS. HE STATES THAT SYSTEMS CONCEIVED INITIALLY ONLY
AS BARGAINING CHIPS HAVE IN THE PAST OFTEN ENDED UP AS NEW
ARMS SYSTEMS, WHICH HAVE BEEN "THE MAIN FACTOR IN THE DESTABIL-
IZATION OF THE BILATERAL STRATEGIC BALANCE."

6. THE NEW OFFENSIVE WEAPONS AGREEMENT: EXPLAINING THE REASONING BEHIND THE PERIOD OF VALIDITY CONTEMPLATED FOR THE NEW OFFENSIVE WEAPONS AGREEMENT, TROFIMENKO STATES THAT "ESTABLISHMENT OF SUCH A PERIOD OF VALIDITY FOR THE PROPOSED NEW AGREEMENT IS BASED UPON THE OPTIMAL
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PERIOD OF TIME (ISKHODIT IZ OPTIMAL'NOGO SROKA), DURING THE COURSE OF WHICH ANY AGREEMENT ON THIS QUESTION CAN REMAIN IN FORCE WITHOUT REEXAMINATION, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE PACE OF THE MILITARY-TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION."
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